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Is NAFTA Economic Integration?
ome analysts consider the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) part of a larger
economic integration process that goes beyond
narrowly defined trade policy (Pastor 1992, Wein-
traub 1993b). Because of U.S. initiatives, issues with
only tenuous direct connections to trade have come
under negotiation. A harmonization of national
policies that appears tantamount to a broad move-
ment toward integration seems to be under way.
But is it? NAFTA clearly makes trade freer
on a broad front among the signatories and will
result in the efficiency enhancements typical of
trade openings. However, in many cases, what may
at first look like integration appears on further
scrutiny simply to be a continuation of a Hegelian
dialectic over trade policy.1
To show why a Hegelian dialectic appropri-
ately characterizes what took place with NAFTA
and the parallel agreements and why economic
integration seems a less appropriate characteriza-
tion, we begin by considering the antecedents of
the NAFTA negotiations. The events that precipi-
tated NAFTA began, at the very latest, in the 1970s.
Conflict and innovation in recent
U.S. trade postures
From the end of World War II until the late
1970s, U.S. trade policy involved an unconditional
interpretation of the most favored nation (MFN)
clause of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).2 The United States was the world’s
principal proponent of a multilateral approach to
international trade liberalization.
But by the late 1970s, the United States had
become frustrated with GATT. The sources of
frustration were the caravan effect (GATT negotia-
tions emulate a caravan that moves only as fast as
its slowest camel); the free-rider problem (some
countries, chiefly the less developed ones, have
benefited from the multilateral system without
much lowering their own barriers); and the rise of
trade-related issues not covered by GATT, such as
direct foreign investment, trade in services, and
intellectual property rights (Primo Braga 1989, 245).
Over time, these three problems became
more frustrating for the United States. While the
caravan effect is self-explanatory, both the free-
rider problem and trade-related issues not covered
by GATT deserve more detailed attention.
Although many countries had entered GATT
because they wanted open foreign markets, they
were often less interested in opening their own.
For the less developed countries (LDCs), whose
competitive positions against the developed nations
were unfavorable in many industries, these predi-
lections were considered understandable. GATT
allowed the LDCs to surrender less protectionism
than the industrialized nations and offered LDCs
special openings to the developed countries under
1 We use the term Hegelian dialectic, in the context of trade
policy, to signify the process by which innovations in trade
liberalization are countered by innovations in protectionism
and are succeeded by some synthesis that is temporarily
acceptable to each of the two competing sides, followed by
yet another innovation in liberalization, countered by yet
another innovation in protectionism, followed by yet another
synthesis, and so on. It should be noted that Kane (1988)
poses the evolution of financial regulation in the same way,
while Gruben (1992) describes NAFTA as a game that leads
to a dialectical progression.
2 The MFN clause requires a member nation that lowers tariffs
on specific products from a given country to lower them to
all nations. However, less developed countries receive
“special and differential treatment” that exempts them from
certain aspects of the MFN in the interests of economic
development. In supporting the unconditional interpreta-
tion of the MFN, the United States persistently has con-
tested the policy of special and differential treatment.
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the generalized system of preferences (GSP).3 But
to some countries, these special opportunities were
not enough. A historical peculiarity of GATT offered
countries a freeway to still more protectionism.
Because pre-World War II protectionists had
focused their energies on tariffs, tariffs are what
GATT had been designed to lower. Over time,
many GATT signatories simply replaced their tariff
barriers, which are discouraged by GATT, with
other, GATT-legal barriers. Quantity restrictions,
expressed through quotas and permits, became
commonplace, as did regulations and standards
concerning “product quality.” Export subsidies
became popular. Detailed regulations against direct
foreign investment surfaced. Some countries
became harbors for intellectual piracy, maintaining
weak patent and copyright protection in order to
become centers for unlicensed production.
During the 1980s, particularly in LDCs, these
innovations in protectionism proliferated in response
to terms-of-trade shocks and foreign debt prob-
lems. Surmising that the raw materials price booms
of the 1970s would continue in the 1980s, many
LDCs had devised debt-led growth strategies and
found foreign bankers to support them. But at the
end of the 1970s, a shift in U.S. monetary policy
triggered a sudden rise in interest rates, making
debt a tortuous route to any goal. At the begin-
ning of the 1980s, the prices of the LDCs’ tradi-
tional raw materials exports entered a protracted
slump. To address their new balance-of-payments
and debt problems,4 many LDCs adopted philoso-
phies more reminiscent of eighteenth-century
mercantilism than of GATT, and they expressed
them through GATT-legal nontariff innovations.
Meanwhile, certain technological develop-
ments caused the United States to find foreign pro-
tectionist innovations increasingly baneful. Since
the 1960s, innovations in transportation and com-
munications had inspired a rise in “production
sharing,” in which firms located one portion of a
total manufacturing operation in Taiwan, another
stage in Singapore, and perhaps another in Mexico.
By the 1980s, further revolutions in communica-
tions and in production technology had allowed a
surge in opportunities for U.S. trade in services.
This surge prompted the United States to push its
trading partners to permit more such trade.
Trade in services, however, involves compli-
cations that are less common in the goods trade.
Much services trade operates most efficiently in
locations where producer and consumer physically
meet. For trade in services, someone must travel,
typically the seller. The service producer prefers to
locate itself and its capital-goods inputs at the market,
so the buyer will not have to travel to use them.
But in international trade, locating at the
market means that the host country’s investment
rules have an overriding effect on sales opportuni-
ties. Rules that restrict foreign investment hinder
U.S. services trade. Moreover, because many U.S.
services exports involve specialized technological
knowledge—embodied in machinery, in software,
or in employees—the development and profitabil-
ity of such trade often depends on the protection
of intellectual property rights. The risk of technol-
ogy theft has a chilling effect. By the 1980s, the
accelerating pace of technological development,
together with the increasing ease of pirating new
technology, made such risk steadily greater.5
Since these factors made opening trade more
attractive to the United States at the same time
that LDC innovations in protectionism were raising
trade barriers, the United States launched a pro-
gram of what came to be called “aggressive recip-
rocity.”6 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and
3 The GSP allows virtually duty-free entry of designated
products from designated developing countries (the LDCs)
into the United States and other developed nations.
4 Latin America’s debt-led commercial policies, which mixed
export incentives with import restrictions, did help Latin
America begin to generate balance-of-trade surpluses from
1983 on. Even so, the region’s external debt continued to
mount. That is, the regional surplus in the balance of goods
and nonfactor services remained too small to offset the
deficit in the factor services balance (interest, profits, and
dividends) (Primo Braga 1990).
5 For a discussion of the acceleration in technology, the rising
ease of appropriating it without permission, and other
issues related to the United States’ increased interest in the
protection of intellectual property, see Mody (1990).
6 It is important to note that the United States continued its
program of aggressive reciprocity even after Latin American
countries began to lower their trade barriers in the broad-
based liberalization efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This pattern is one of many that raise questions as to how
many of the United States’ announced efforts on behalf of
free trade are really acts of disguised protectionism.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1994 37
its revision, “Super 301,” under the Omnibus
Trade and Competitive Act of 1988 allowed the
United States new maneuverability in threatening
unilateral trade retaliations. The United States
used these threats to extract trade openings from
other countries and to induce trading partners to
tighten their intellectual property protection. (Such
was the case, for example, with Brazil and com-
puter software.)
Innovative protectionists soon contrived to
apply measures expressly designed to open trade
to quite different purposes. For example, the
United States used Section 301 and Super 301 to
negotiate “voluntary” export restraints, a U.S. inno-
vation in protectionism in which exporting coun-
tries “volunteer” to restrict their exports to the
United States. Foreigners slow in volunteering were
not long in receiving U.S. threats of 301-based
trade sanctions. The United States also stepped
up countervailing actions, such as raising duties,
against countries it charged with dumping or
other “unfair” trade practices.7 In many cases, the
merits of these charges have been questionable
(Bovard 1992).
In sum, in the context of U.S. trade policy,
two types of dialectics were operative. First, a
dialectic operated between forces in the United
States that wanted free trade abroad but not so
much at home, and foreign countries that also
wanted free trade abroad but not so much at
home. That is, as one side developed innovations
in both liberalization and protectionism, they were
countered by those of the other side.
Second, the realignment in trade patterns
that inspired the United States’ initiatives at the
GATT negotiations also changed who wanted
protectionism and who did not. Some U.S. firms
that had favored protectionism discovered that
changes in production technology and in markets
had made freer trade agreeable. Other traditional
protectionists found that these same changes
favored increased protectionist efforts.
To illuminate this redistribution of protec-
tionist pressures, some details of the dynamics of
production-sharing deserve attention. Production
sharing simply meant that it became more common
for U.S. firms to export partially manufactured
products for further processing abroad, and then
to import, perhaps for further processing in the
United States before final sale.
As such trade developed, firms and indus-
tries carrying out production sharing inclined
increasingly toward trade liberalization at home
(Gonzalez and Velez 1992). After all, producers
who import their inputs often benefit from low
trade barriers. Manufacturing firms’ lobbying efforts
on behalf of protectionism began to diminish
(Magee 1990). Moreover, U.S. production-sharing
manufacturers became more interested in negoti-
ating liberalized foreign investment laws in foreign
countries that made attractive platforms for pro-
duction-sharing operations. These interests were
consistent with those of U.S. service-exporting
firms, even though the latter intended to sell
abroad the products of their foreign operations.
On the other side of the dialectical process,
U.S. labor groups viewed increased U.S. manufac-
turing operations abroad as signifying fewer union
jobs in the United States. Accordingly, unions
increased both direct and indirect pressure toward
restricting trade.
In an innovative example of indirect pres-
sure, U.S. labor organizations began to ally with
groups that were concerned about environmental
problems abroad. These allied organizations
accused U.S. firms of moving operations abroad
to take advantage of looser environmental laws
or enforcement. They petitioned Congress for
measures that might impede firms from reexporting
to the United States. Such measures could not
only discourage some firms from continuing to
operate abroad, even if environmental considera-
tions had not been the motive underlying their
locations, but could discourage others from estab-
lishing foreign operations in the future.8
NAFTA as the next step
These redistributions of pressures for and
against trade liberalization manifested themselves
7 Between 1970–75 and 1980–85, U.S. countervailing ac-
tions went up by more than 1,000 percent (Nam 1987).
8 An example of another alliance between environmentalists
and protectionists appears to have surfaced in debates
over NAFTA. An anti-NAFTA advertisement in the Septem-
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further in the establishment of the negotiating
frameworks that would lead to NAFTA. The oppor-
tunities for a free trade agreement had increased
with the decline of protectionist pressures from
U.S. manufacturers. U.S. labor organizations, how-
ever, urged negotiation for parallel agreements
without which, unions argued, NAFTA itself would
promote a type of competition that was destructive.
The progress of the parallel negotiations
offered much evidence to suggest that protection-
ists saw the discussions of side agreements as a
second chance to sink NAFTA. As one after another
agreement was reached on environmental and
other issues, none was adequate. Disparities between
U.S. and Mexican labor and environmental laws—
or their enforcement—increasingly attracted
charges of “social dumping” (AFL–CIO 1992).
One major sticking point in the parallel
negotiations implies a great deal about whether
the U.S. agenda involved integration or whether
it reflected the protectionist side of a dialectical
process. Although all three parties concurred that
violation of the parallel covenants ought to incur
penalties, the United States was unique in arguing
that the penalties ought to include selected revivals
of protectionism. Canadian and Mexican negotia-
tors, perceiving a contradiction in the use of pro-
tectionism to achieve free trade, favored fines.9
Moreover, some of NAFTA’s moves toward what
has been referred to as integration can also be
seen as attempts by U.S. protectionists to broaden
their efforts against freer trade by pushing issues
that Canadians and Mexicans may perceive to
involve their national sovereignty.
In any case, the efforts of pro- and antipro-
tectionist forces have jointly determined NAFTA
and will likely determine how the agreement will
evolve over time.10 To more fully elucidate these
competing forces—and the likely outcomes of
their conflict over the life of the agreement—we
selectively discuss NAFTA itself, its expected
effects, and the political forces that will influence
its implementation. We also consider in more
detail the emergence of the parallel agreements.
The negotiated NAFTA:
Liberalization and protectionism
In arguing that NAFTA may signify something
besides economic integration, we have focused
on the parallel agreements because they reflect
both protectionist and liberalizing pressures. But
NAFTA itself reflects the same opposing forces.
NAFTA does not free trade, but it certainly
liberalizes it. Over a fifteen-year period, NAFTA
initially reduces and ultimately eliminates all tariffs
and most nontariff barriers between Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. Moreover, NAFTA
is a GATT-forward agreement; no signatories can
increase their tariffs on imports from countries
within or outside the free trade area.
Although full elimination of tariffs will take
fifteen years (Table 1), about 68 percent of goods
imported from Mexico could enter the United
States without tariffs as soon as the agreement goes
Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Humane Society of the
United States, and other environmental groups declares:
Take the Marine Mammal Protection Act. It specifies
that yellowfin tuna cannot be imported from coun-
tries that violate a U.S. law that limits the number of
dolphins killed while catching the tuna. Mexico cur-
rently violates this law. But under NAFTA, the manner
in which a product is produced (in other words, the
way fish are caught) cannot alone prevent their
import. Good-bye dolphin protection.
Offering a rather different perspective, Jan Gilbreath
(1993, 10) notes:
The United States in 1990 outlawed Mexican tuna to
protest fishing practices that had resulted in thou-
sands of dolphin deaths. Nearly four years later the
U.S. embargo continues—despite the fact that Mexi-
can dolphin kills today are negligible. That Mexico,
the world’s fourth largest tuna producer, could re-
spond so dramatically to U.S. environmental con-
cerns and still fail to break down an environmentally
inspired trade barrier has prompted many
policymakers to question whether the tuna–dolphin
issue has shifted from a U.S. policy of protecting
global resources to one aimed at protecting a do-
mestic tuna industry.
9 In a compromise, the final draft of the parallel agreements
contains provisions for fines against the governments of
offending countries. If these fines are not paid, tariffs will be
imposed.
10 As an example, in an attempt to secure votes sufficient to
ratify NAFTA, the Clinton administration entered into NAFTA-
related agreements that were not part of NAFTA in order to
reerect barriers in orange juice trade that NAFTA would
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into effect. At the same time, 50 percent of U.S.
exports to Mexico are now tariff-free. Other, less
obvious merchandise trade barriers also were re-
moved. In the traditional in-bond, or maquiladora,
industries’ performance (export) requirements11
and restrictions on domestic sales evaporated
when the agreement went into effect.
Moreover, NAFTA addresses much more
than merchandise trade. In a trinational context,
the agreement realizes the United States’ long-held
goals of liberalizing trade in services and foreign
investment rules abroad, and it tightens the pro-
tection of intellectual property. It is important to
note that, in this context, NAFTA represents an
achievement the United States has had more diffi-
culty realizing in a broader multilateral context.12
Although NAFTA opens Canada and the
United States, it accomplishes its most significant
liberalizations in Mexico. NAFTA expands Canadian
and U.S. companies’ ability to establish or purchase
a business in Mexico and facilitates their ability to
sell out if they want to leave. NAFTA also loosens
previous restrictions on expanding operations for
such companies, and it removes restrictions on
profit remittances to foreign countries. Local content
requirements are eliminated, although NAFTA-
wide content rules will exist. Through NAFTA,
Mexico extends temporary work permits to service
providers from Canada and the United States and
removes licensing and performance criteria.
Despite much liberalization, however, NAFTA
initially retains protectionist elements, some of
which persist indefinitely. NAFTA protects sensi-
tive sectors—such as agriculture, minerals, bank-
ing, textiles, and apparel—by stretching out the
phase-in time. This protection is temporary.
But as the synthesis of liberal and protec-
tionist pressures, NAFTA contains other types of
protection that are not only permanent but also
raise trade barriers above pre-NAFTA levels.13 In a
number of sectors—notably automobiles, textiles,
and apparel—NAFTA imposes North American
content rules, some of which appear to increase pro-
Table 1
NAFTA: Schedule of Tariff Elimination
U.S. imports Mexican imports
from Mexico from the United States
Category Date (Percent of total) (Percent of total)
Duty-free before agreement 13.9 17.9
Additional opening effective on
NAFTA start data: January 1, 1994 53.8 31.0
Additional opening five years after 8.5 17.4
Additional opening ten years after 23.1 31.8
Additional opening fifteen years after .7 1.4
Total Value $28.9 billion $14.2 billion
SOURCE: USITC (1993, 1–3).
11 For example, before NAFTA, U.S. automobile manufactur-
ing subsidiaries in Mexico had to export at least two units of
value added for every unit imported. NAFTA eliminates
such requirements.
12 At the 1982 GATT ministerial meetings, the United States
attempted to launch a new round of negotiations focused on
these issues but was defeated. These same issues have
been addressed at the subsequent Uruguay Round but,
from the perspective of U.S. goals, with limited success.
13 See Morici (1993), Johnson (1993), Barry and Siwicki (1993),
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tectionism. Under the Canada–United States Free
Trade Agreement, for example, automobiles could
be imported duty-free if they contain at least 50
percent Canadian–U.S. inputs. For auto imports to
receive NAFTA benefits, the North American rule
is 62.5 percent. For textiles or apparel to qualify
for “free” trade under NAFTA, all components—
starting with the yarn or fiber—must be made in
North America.14 This NAFTA covenant extends
and strengthens the protectionism inherent in the
broader, multinational Multifiber Agreement.
Nevertheless, NAFTA unequivocally liberal-
izes trade in North America. It is also noteworthy
that the agreement offers only minimal opportuni-
ties for trade diversion, in which efficient non-
NAFTA producers would be squeezed out of trade
with NAFTA countries simply because the treaty
reduces trade barriers among North American
countries only (Primo Braga 1992). However, the
increase and permanence of domestic content
requirements signals that protectionism has found
a place even in the North American Free Trade
Agreement.
Trade-related effects on the United States:
Output and employment
Although the most famous description of
NAFTA’s ultimate effect is the “sucking sound” of
jobs going to Mexico, more serious attempts to
gauge the effects of NAFTA exist.15 These studies
do not all take the same approach, and their results
vary considerably.16 Some studies involve static
models. A few are dynamic. Some accommodate
capital flows, but most do not. Others are histori-
cally based. However, the majority involve com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models, are
highly disaggregated, and find positive but small
welfare and output effects for the United States.17
After all, Mexico begins NAFTA as a small market
relative to Canada, and the United States has
already signed a free trade agreement with Canada.
Most CGE models assume either rigid wages
and flexible employment, or flexible wages and
full employment. The rigid wage models typically
find small percentage gains in employment, while
the flexible wage models find gains in wages.
Both types, of course, show similar income gains.
In a model that a little more fully accommodated
characteristics of the real world—with somewhat
flexible wages and less than full employment—
the effect of NAFTA will probably include less
employment growth than the rigid wage models,
less wage growth than the full employment models,
and about the same income growth as either.
Static CGE models without capital flows
typically show the smallest effects, regardless of
NAFTA country.18 Some static CGE models incor-
porate increasing returns to scale.19 As output
grows, income grows even more. Even these show
only small percentage gains in real income, real
wages, and employment. The empirical impor-
tance of scale effects, as opposed to pure improve-
ments in efficiency from greater competition,
remains small (Tybout and Westbrook 1993 and
Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe 1991). Dynamic models
portend larger effects on growth, especially for
Mexico (Young and Romero 1991).
Two other branches of the literature are less
consistently sanguine about the effects of NAFTA
for the United States. The first branch, whose fore-
most representative is Leamer (1991), offers argu-
ments based upon factor price equalization through
trade and migration. These arguments are consistent
14 Exceptions include silk and flax (Barry and Siwicki 1993,
138).
15 Space precludes a systematic treatment of these studies,
but more comprehensive overviews than what we offer
can be found in Lustig et al. (1992) and Globerman and
Walker (1993). We have provided in the references an
extensive list of studies that address NAFTA’s effects on
the United States.
16 Although most of these studies were performed before the
text of the agreement was finalized, we agree with Wein-
traub’s (1993a) conclusion that nothing in the agreement
would substantially change the results of these studies.
17 These include Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson (1991),
Hinojosa-Ojeda and McCleery (1990), KMPG Peat Marwick
(1991), Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1991a and 1991b),
and USITC (1991). See Brown (1992) for a survey.
18 See Brown (1992, 35–37), Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson
(1991 and 1992), Hinojosa-Ojeda and McLeery (1990), and
Roland-Holst, Reinert, and Shiells (1992).
19 Roland-Holst, Reinert and Shiells (1992) and Brown,
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with the Stolper–Samuelson theorem that opening
trade will decrease low-skilled wages in the United
States because Mexican exports are intensive in
low-skilled labor. However, Hinojosa-Ojeda and
Robinson (1992) argue that the relative sizes of the
U.S. and Mexican economies and NAFTA’s long
phase-in period mean the Stolper–Samuelson
effect will be small; it would be swamped by the
other, growth-enhancing effects of the agreement.
A second branch of the literature regards
NAFTA from an historical point of view. Although
some of this literature (Hufbauer and Schott 1992;
Weintraub 1991) offers conclusions consistent
with those of the CGE models, a series of briefing
papers from the Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
does not.20 These papers derive historical parallels,
abstracting from individual industry experiences,
to hypothesize about the U.S. macroeconomy.
Their narratives typically assume, for example, that
what has happened in the automobile industry
is an accurate guide to what will happen in the
U.S. macroeconomy. For the Economic Policy
Institute, the results of NAFTA for the United
States are negative.
An interesting artifact of the EPI papers is
their argument that “free trade” over the last fifteen
years has, despite U.S. employment growth during
that time, been a principal cause of the move-
ment of jobs to other countries. In fact, there is
evidence to suggest that U.S. policy has been in-
creasingly protectionist over this period, although
the Economic Policy Institute authors may view
the increase as too small to budge the United
States from free trade. However, the authors do
not discuss the empirical evidence presented by
Gruben (1990a and 1990b) and Truett and Truett
(1993) that jobs that went to Mexico during this
period would otherwise have gone to Asia. The
Economic Policy Institute authors not only dismiss
the United States’ increases in employment and
declining unemployment rates during this period,
but they do not deal with the claim that jobs move
to other sectors in an economy rather than to
other countries.21
Nevertheless, arguments that picture massive
movement of jobs to Mexico seemed to carry
weight even after NAFTA passed. Moreover, the
idea that foreign countries are taking jobs to which
Americans are entitled continues to be a focal
point of the larger U.S. protectionist movement.
Sectoral effects
If most studies of the impacts of NAFTA
suggest overall expansion for the United States,
why did protectionists turn so much of their
energy against the agreement? In a broad sense,
the answer is that the opening of trade shifts
resources and production from less competitive
to more competitive sectors, inspiring renewed
political efforts from the less competitive. Accord-
ing to traditional Hecksher–Ohlin–Samuelson
analysis, the sectors that will prove most competi-
tive (and therefore gain most from trade) will use
the nation’s relatively more abundant factors of
production relatively intensely.
Compared with most other countries, and
certainly with Mexico, the United States has a
relative abundance of physical capital (plants and
equipment) and human capital (an educated work
force). Industries that require relatively low-skilled
labor or low levels of physical capital to make
tradeable products will find much to dislike about
NAFTA unless they can establish operations abroad.
Nevertheless, displacement of workers
across sectors of the U.S. economy will likely be
small in both absolute and relative terms, because
the sizes of the economies and work forces of
Mexico and Canada are small compared with
those of the United States. Most studies suggest
that U.S. sectors that lose include sugar refining,
fruits and vegetables, apparel, and household
appliances. Sectors that gain include chemicals,
instruments, machinery and equipment, motor
vehicles, instruments, and rubber and plastic.
Neither the output and employment gains of the
winners nor the losses of the losers appear to be
large, according to most models, but losers appear
to find cold comfort in such estimates.
Finally, an important reason reactive antilib-
eralization lobbying is typically strong—regardless
of the nature and benefits of the particular trade
20 See, for example, Faux and Lee (1992) and Blecker and
Spriggs (1992).
21 For more detailed critiques of the Economic Policy Institute
papers, see Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson (1992), Wein-
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initiative—is that it is easier for those who are
likely to lose their jobs to know they are likely to
lose them than for those who may gain jobs to
know they would be the ones to gain them. After
all, even if new jobs are created, someone else
might get them.
Services
As technological advances have increased
opportunities for U.S. trade in services, the United
States has intensified efforts to negotiate openings
for it. Services trade negotiations demand a differ-
ent focus from goods trade negotiations because
service trade protectionism differs from goods
trade protectionism. Domestic services providers
cannot be protected by tariffs and quotas. Imports
of services are not easily detected by customs
officers at international borders.
Instead, services trade protectionism empha-
sizes laws that focus not on the product, but on
the producer. Some countries outlaw foreign-
owned service companies of various types and
prohibit foreigners from acquiring controlling
ownership in existing domestic companies. Some
bestow monopolies on particular domestically
owned producers. Some regulate foreign-owned
companies differently than domestically owned
firms of the same type. As a final complicating
factor, one country’s regulations for its service firms
will typically differ substantially from another
country’s regulations for its service firms. The
ideal solution is to harmonize regulations.
In many cases, NAFTA’s services openings
reflect less protectionism than the clauses for goods
trade. NAFTA does not create full harmonization,
but it moves in that direction and it particularly
opens Mexico. NAFTA provides for national treat-
ment, which means that a U.S. firm in Mexico is
supposed to be treated regulatorily as if it were a
Mexican firm. National treatment under NAFTA is
not de jure, but de facto. That is,  foreign firms
may still face different regulatory treatment than
domestic firms, as long as the effect of the regula-
tions is equivalent and does not place foreign
firms at a competitive disadvantage.
The services that received the most attention
in the NAFTA negotiations were finance, insur-
ance, transportation, and telecommunications.
NAFTA does not change requirements for
foreign banks’ entry into the United States and
Canada, but the opening of the Mexican financial
system is among the agreement’s most significant
achievements. Because the standards for entry are
tied to the size of the Mexican banking system,
they will change over time. But in the context of
the size of the Mexican banking system at the end
of 1992, entry into Mexican banking by Canadian
or U.S. firms would require the commitment of
reserves and paid-up capital of between $20 million
and $60 million. Requirements will likely go up,
not down, in the future. Although this means U.S.
banks may be slow to move into Mexico, their
presence there will grow over time. Requirements
for entry into brokerage, bonding, insurance,
leasing, and warehousing are more liberal. One
would expect more initial entry by U.S. specialists
in these areas.22
Transportation services on both sides of the
border stand to gain under NAFTA, especially in
trucking. Eighty-two percent of freight in Mexico
is moved by road (USITC 1991, 4–48). Mexican
exports of trucking services to the United States
will likely increase if border and inland infrastruc-
ture improvements continue to take place in
Mexico.23 The longer term implications of NAFTA
include increases in U.S. trucking services as well,
but NAFTA will have only a marginal effect on
other transport services. Other transport services
will be affected only marginally by NAFTA (USITC
1991, 4–48). Clearly, trade in goods is transport-
service intensive and infrastructure development
on both sides of the border will be needed.
Trade in telecommunications and related
goods trade received a large boost from the priva-
tization of Telefonos Mexicanos (TELMEX) in 1991.
Basic telephone services are the main service
traded between the United States and Mexico, with
the United States being a net importer of these
services. NAFTA should shift the balance of trade
in favor of the United States in the basic services,
22 For an extensive treatment, see Gruben, Welch, and Gunther
(1993).
23 In recent years a large share of infrastructure investment in
Mexico has been private. Toll roads are a particularly
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especially in related equipment, as the investment
in this sector increases over the coming years.
Intellectual property rights protection
Because of the importance of intellectual
property protection in facilitating services trade
and foreign investment, NAFTA’s coverage of this
topic has received much notice. Moreover, it has
been argued that the provisions on patent and
trade secrets offer the highest standards of protec-
tion achieved in any trade negotiations (USITC
1993, 3–7).
One of the most significant provisions of this
section, and in NAFTA in general, is the codifica-
tion of national treatment. This codification ensures
that the intellectual property of firms from any
two NAFTA countries will be legally treated in the
third as if it had been developed in that country.
A second important general provision is the
strict limitation on the use of compulsory patent
licenses, which has affected Canada’s process for
patenting pharmaceutical patents.
A third important detail obligates the signa-
tory countries to enforce intellectual property
rights against infringement not only internally
but also at the border. That is, NAFTA includes
sanctions not only against the production of
pirated products, but against their importation.
Despite these and other provisions, including
those for judicial procedures to ensure enforce-
ment, Canada, Mexico and the United States all
offered strong intellectual property protection
before NAFTA was signed. Indeed, NAFTA implies
few significant changes in U.S. intellectual property
laws and will not much change Mexican patent
law, which was upgraded in 1991 to a level con-
sistent with those of major industrial countries.24
One of the most important aspects of intellec-
tual property protection in NAFTA is that it helps
ensure the durability of Mexico’s new intellectual
property law. Still, differences between the Mexican,
Canadian, and U.S. legal systems offer oppor-
tunities for complications.
Under Mexican law, precedent does not
automatically control the implementation of law.
Protection in most cases is extended to a firm or
individual only if that party successfully litigates
the issue. The costs of gaining effective protection
are accordingly high. Under NAFTA, the effects
of such divergences in legal systems may be
reduced, but there is clearly much to suggest that
NAFTA’s service-related clauses do not constitute
harmonization.25
Migration
From the United States’ point of view, a
raison d’être of NAFTA is the hope that it will ease
pressures on migration from Mexico to the United
States. Because trade openings tend to equalize
real wages across countries (factor price equaliza-
tion), the argument goes, incentives for cross-
border migration would decline.
Results reported by the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission (1991) from partial
equilibrium models show such convergence, most
of it from an increase in Mexican wages. Hinojosa-
Ojeda and McCleery (1990) model migration,
trade, and capital flows with dual labor markets
(high wage and low wage) in both the United
States and Mexico, and add a maquiladora sector.
According to their results, NAFTA would decrease
migration because wages would rise more in
Mexico than in the United States.
The picture clouds when one incorporates
Mexico’s large and inefficient ejido (or collective
farm) system, as do Levy and Van Wijnbergen
(1992) and Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson (1991).
Under NAFTA, U.S. exports of maize and soybeans
could not only offer competition to the ejidos but
could accordingly induce worker dislocation in
this system. The result could involve increases in
migration to the United States.
The Mexican government’s recent restructur-
ing of the ejido system, to facilitate infrastructure
and capital goods investment through partnership
or leasing agreements with business organizations,
may allow more competitive operations. However,
these same steps may induce some ejido farmers
24 Mexico, however, must amend its law to reverse the burden
of proving infringement of process patents, placing the
burden on the accused infringer.
25 See Alejandro Junco (1991). Under Mexican law, prece-
dent is extended when favorable decisions are delivered in
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to take their money and leave, even if the extra
income might also motivate them to remain in
Mexico instead of migrating to the United States.
The long phase-in period of NAFTA for
agricultural products typical of the ejidos, how-
ever, gives the farmers more time to make their
deals and their decisions before competition
intensifies, which will smooth and slow the
transition.
Beyond NAFTA: The environmental,
workplace, and adjustment agreements
In the parallel agreements and even in NAFTA
itself, the United States has pushed its agenda in
directions that blur the demarcation between trade
issues and public policy actions that only indirectly
affect trade. In some contexts, it is easy to see
why this blurring could occur. For example, if a
country’s zealous health standards on food imports
could be seen as impediments to trade, why not
differences in environmental protection and work-
place standards?
Workplace conditions and environmental
protection have been pushed to the forefront of
the NAFTA debate. During the vote on fast-track
status, President Bush committed to trilateral side
or parallel negotiations on the harmonization of
environmental policies, labor laws, and worker
retraining or other adjustment assistance. Upon
assuming office, President Clinton voiced his
support for NAFTA with the caveat that the side
agreements be completed before the treaty would
be submitted to Congress for ratification.
Environmental concerns
All three NAFTA countries consider environ-
mental problems to be important policy issues.
Mexico’s pollution problems, especially those in
Mexico City and along the border, have become
acute. In the NAFTA negotiations, a principal
environmental concern has been that loose regula-
tions constitute an unfair trade advantage. The
question, then, is what are the likely environmental
effects of NAFTA?
Two common fears about NAFTA are that
the consequent economic growth in all three
countries, but especially Mexico, will cause more
pollution and that Mexico will be a haven for
polluting U.S. manufacturers. Plausible as conjec-
tures, these issues seem less compelling in light of
recent research and current Mexican policy efforts.
Grossman and Krueger (1991) statistically
model the interaction of trade, growth, and pollu-
tion in a cross-section of countries. They show
that, when per capita income in a country is very
low, higher output (and therefore income) gener-
ates higher pollution. But beyond a per capita
income of $5,000,26 pollution control becomes a
normal good. Further increases in income cause
pollution to fall.27 Since Mexico’s per capita income
in 1988 was almost exactly $5,000, Grossman and
Krueger’s results suggest that the increased growth
in Mexico due to NAFTA will improve Mexico’s
environment.
The evidence likewise suggests that laxer
environmental regulation was not significant in
motivating U.S. firms to relocate in Mexico. Environ-
mental abatement costs in the United States are
low, averaging between 1 percent to 2.5 percent
of total production costs (Grossman and Krueger
1991, 25, and Cropper and Oates 1992). Moreover,
firms that relocated typically had lower abatement
costs in the United States before moving than
those that did not relocate (Grossman and Krueger
1991, 27). This correlation may be spurious. But if
one considers that heavy industry typically both
pollutes more and requires higher job skills than
light industry, and that firms that move to Mexico
go there for lower-skilled workers, this result
seems less implausible.
Nevertheless, some U.S. firms have indeed
moved to Mexico because of stepped-up environ-
mental regulation in the United States. Some Cali-
fornia furniture companies, for example, moved
operations to Mexico after California tightened
regulations on paint coatings and solvents (Gross-
man and Krueger 1991, 22). However, the number
was small relative to the total number of furniture
producers in the state of California, let alone in
the rest of the United States.
26 Expressed in 1985 U.S. dollars.
27 Other studies reviewed by Globerman (1993) find a similar
relationship.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1994 45
Some of the environmental concern stems
from two inaccurate assumptions. The first is that
Mexico continues to be lax in environmental
regulation; the second is that NAFTA does not
address environmental issues. The first assumption
ignores improvements in Mexican policy over the
last decade. Under the Salinas administration, the
budget for the Mexican environmental authority
(SEDESOL) grew from $4 million in 1989 to about
$68 million in 1992 (Hufbauer and Schott 1993,
92). In 1993, Mexican government expenditures on
environmental protection approached 1 percent of
gross domestic product. The powers of Mexico’s
environmental authority have been expanded
significantly since its creation, and the government
is preparing market-based environmental reforms
such as auctioning pollution rights. Moreover, the
Mexican government has lately closed a number
of polluting factories, most notably PEMEX’s Azca-
potzalco refinery in Mexico City.
But not all environmental concerns are mis-
taken. Geographically, an important environmental
issue is the U.S.–Mexico border, and with good
reason. Environmental damage there is significant.
Raw sewage and water problems date at least to
the 1950s. With the development of the border’s
maquiladora plants, beginning in the 1960s, dump-
ing of toxic chemicals has aggravated the dangers.
However, the United States and Mexico have
already entered into side agreements for the border.
The most comprehensive is the so-called Mexican–
U.S. Integrated Border Protection Plan, for which
the United States has pledged $379 million and
Mexico has pledged $466 million (Globerman
1993, 296–97). Some find the effort lacking, but
the program is an important step.
NAFTA does address the environment directly.
Signatories must commit to a half-dozen addi-
tional international environmental agreements,
and each country agrees not to lower existing
environmental protection, or health and safety
standards, to attract investment. Individual coun-
tries may maintain stricter standards than NAFTA
requires.
However, some of NAFTA’s significant
environmental components are not in NAFTA
proper but in the parallel agreements. Under the
dispute settlement mechanism outlined in the
parallel agreement on the environment, individuals
or groups in one country can file complaints
about environmental abuses in another, and repre-
sentatives from each of the disputing countries
will be chosen and will attempt to negotiate a
settlement. If this fails, the complaint goes to a
panel of experts for adjudication. A country that
receives an unfavorable ruling has sixty days to
enforce it. If the country fails to enforce, it may
incur up to a $20 million fine. If the government
of the country fails to pay, the complaining
country may level tariffs against the products of
the offending industry.
It should be noted that NAFTA-related agree-
ments differ from most trade pacts in that disputes
in the latter are almost always required to involve
directly trade-related issues. By contrast, according
to the office of the U.S. Trade Representative,28
“any environmental or natural resource issue may
be addressed” by NAFTA’s environmental com-
mission. The parallel agreement offers more than
the usual scope of international adjudication
opportunities to those concerned about environ-
mental abuses.
Workplace conditions
U.S. labor organizations typically express
concerns that Mexico’s workplace regulations—
including those related to safety and health, child
labor, benefits, and hours of work—will send U.S.
firms over the border. However, Mexico’s work-
place regulations are strong and, in some cases,
tighter than those in the United States. Mexican
law establishes 14 as the minimum working age.
Persons ages 14 through 16 may not work more
than six hours per day and are prohibited from
working in occupations designated as hazardous.
Minors may not work more than a forty-eight-hour
week (Weintraub 1993a, 28–29). Mexican regula-
tions on maternity leave, sick leave, and profit
sharing are more generous to workers than those
of the United States.
Nevertheless, legitimate concerns about
enforcement remain. It is these concerns that
inspired the parallel negotiations and agreement
on labor. The labor commission, which serves as
28 This quotation appears in Sheehan (1993).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 46
the review body for the parallel agreement, has a
broad mandate that covers worker benefits, indus-
trial relations, and occupational health and safety.
In NAFTA’s labor-related dispute settlement
framework, the form of litigation itself offers
particularly strong opportunities for protectionist
pressures. For example, the dispute settlement
process will operate under the influence of a joint
advisory committee, along with evaluation com-
mittees of experts made up of representatives
from labor-supported organizations. This commis-
sion is supposed to provide expert advice on
regulatory matters and will have a high degree of
access to commission proceedings.
Adjustment assistance and retraining
Programs that assist and smooth relocation
of displaced workers are fully consistent with the
application of the theory of economic welfare to
trade policy. But the creation of such programs
does not depend on a trade agreement between
the United States and other nations. However, not
only will fiscal budgetary problems make such
programs difficult to pass in the future, but similar
promises of adjustment assistance were made
during the 1980s but not honored.29
Conroy and Glasmeier (1992–93) argue that
current policies are inadequately designed and
constructed to account for the dislocations that
NAFTA will bring. They suggest that the European
Economic Community’s approaches to funding
special adjustment programs be followed. We
concur that worker dislocations deserve attention.
However, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) observe
that the United States, at least, ensures regions
against income shocks. They show that a $1 reduc-
tion in a U.S. region’s per capita personal income
triggers a 34 cent decrease in federal taxes and a 6
cent increase in federal transfers. In the EEC, they
note, the comparable tax reduction is only about
half a cent. They argue that “the current European
tax system has a long way to go before it reaches
the 34 cents of the U.S. federal government.”
Whither NAFTA?
NAFTA and the parallel negotiations have
been described as a move toward greater eco-
nomic integration, and many of their traits are
consistent with it. They offer a framework for
harmonizing much more than just directly trade-
related rules and regulation.
But in the context of recent U.S. trade history,
they may also be seen as part of a dialectical pro-
gression in which shifting protectionist and free-
trade interests compete to synthesize a new trade
policy. U.S. manufacturers’ protectionist lobbying
diminishes, as labor union pressures increase.
Seeking new allies to replace some once-protec-
tionist industrialists, labor organizations associate
themselves with environmentalists. Meanwhile,
some U.S. manufacturers profess to find new forms
of unfairness among their competitors abroad and
so do some agriculturalists. In Mexico, policy
innovations and new interindustry and intergroup
conflicts materialize.
As a result of these conflicting and changing
pressures, NAFTA liberalizes trade on some fronts,
particularly in services, and increases protectionism
on others, as in the rules for increased domestic
content in autos and textiles.
Despite NAFTA’s soft spots, the agreement
offers an important opportunity not only to in-
crease trade in North America, but to signal U.S.
commitment to free trade in general—and to free
trade in particular with respect to intellectual
property rights protection, trade in services, and
trade-related aspects of foreign investment.
However, in NAFTA such increased integra-
tion as occurs is largely a side effect of a dialectic
that continues. At the same time the Clinton
administration pushed to open the United States
to freer trade with Mexico and Canada, it entered
into new agreements with Mexico to restrict the
effects of openings in some types of agriculturally
related trade, including sugar and fruit juice.
Meanwhile, while NAFTA opens trade, NAFTA-
related agreements open broader opportunities for
protectionists to reduce trade through appeals
against environmental and workplace enforce-
ment in areas with little direct effect on the
international exchange of goods and services.
NAFTA opens trade, but the dialectic goes on.
29 Smith (1990) and Faux and Lee (1992).Economic Review — Second Quarter 1994 47
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